关于“重复博弈和机制设置系列问题讲座”的通知

发布日期: 2015-05-04 来源:zzrs 2082

关于“重复博弈和机制设置系列问题讲座”的通知

 

主讲人:陈  波(Southern Methodist University经济系副教授、浙江大学兼任副教授

主持人:汪淼军(经济学系教授)

时间:

1.重复博弈入门讲座              5219:00-11:00

2.重复博弈重要结论及文献综述    52114:00-16:00

3.机制设置入门讲座              6119:00-11:00

4.机制设置经典结论及文献综述    61114:00-16:00

 

讲座主要内容:

The first two lectures will be on repeated games. An important issue in economics is how cooperation can arise given the myopic opportunistic choices faced by economic agents. Repeated games are the primary tool and ideal setting for analyzing and understanding the issue. A general insight from previous work is that cooperative behavior can be maintained using a crucial link between current outcomes and future benefits so that agents refrain from opportunistic behavior if such behavior leads to adverse outcomes in the future. These two lectures will give an introduction to standard repeated game models, a summary of classic results of the repeated game literature, and a set of applications of repeated game models.

 

The next two lectures will be on mechanism design. A central field in modern economics is mechanism design, which employs economic theory and game theory to establish general principles for the optimal design of various institutions and markets in the presence of incentives and private information of self-interested agents. In these lectures, we will give a quick introduction to mechanism design, a brief review of important results in the mechanism design literature, as well as an associated set of applications. Our focus on mechanism design will mainly be on Bayesian mechanism design and dominant strategy mechanism design.

 

地点:浙江大学玉泉校区经济学院340

 

 

陈波简历:

Professor Bo Chen received his PhD from University of Wisconsin – Madison in 2007. He held a position as an Assistant Professor of Economics (2007-2014) and subsequently an Associate Professor of Economics (2014 to present) at Southern Methodist University. Professor Bo Chen is an applied microeconomic theorist. In his research, he attempts to provide rationales of behavior and phenomena in economically relevant situations by employing state-of-the-art theoretical techniques. His research interest lies in understanding economic agents’ incentives in dynamic interactions and market processes, as well as the effects of information asymmetry in the design of various real-world mechanisms. He has been a visiting scholar at University of Bonn (Germany), Kyoto University (Japan), Maastricht University (the Netherlands), and Singapore Management University. He has published extensively in leading academic journals, including American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Mathematical Economics, International Journal of Game Theory, and Management Science. His current research projects include an investigation of the role of information structures in sequential binary coordination problems, quality signaling in a competitive environment, as well as welfare issues in vertically related industries.

 

欢迎广大师生参加!

 

 

浙江大学经济学院

201554